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947 
A MODERN GUIDE TO THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN NEW YORK 
Kyle G. Durante* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) stems 
from the original English common law case, The Duke of Norfolk’s 
Case1 or the Doctrine of Perpetuities.2  The common law rule, as stat-
ed by John Chipman Gray, provides that “[n]o interest is good unless 
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in 
being at the creation of the interest.”3 The primary modifications New 
York has created include the alteration to the fertile octogenarian 
rule, addition of a savings provision for the reduction of age contin-
gencies, removal of the unborn widow rule, and application of the 
RAP to commercial option contracts.  These modifications to the 
common law rules have been beneficial to the evolution of RAP from 
its historic application to its modern necessity.4 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Political 
Science, The University at Buffalo, The State University of New York; A.S., in Criminal 
Justice, Erie Community College. I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her 
support and guidance with this Comment. I would also like to thank my Comments Editor 
Kristen Curley for her assistance and advice during the writing process. 
1 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 931 (Ch. 1681). 
2 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 308 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2014). 
3 JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray eds., 4th ed. 1942) 
(citation omitted).  Two modern approaches to the RAP have been codified in American 
Law.  The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) applies a “flat 90 years 
vesting period, [i]f at the end of 90 years following the creation of the interest, the interest is 
still in existence and unvested, it is invalid.”  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.  
The wait and see approach is the second modern application which applies the same vesting 
period as common law RAP; however, unlike under the common law, the period is deter-
mined retrospectively.  See id. 
4 New York’s codification has been said to have simply mimicked the common law; how-
ever, this statement is misleading.  LEWIS M. SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 310-11 (W. 
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1966). 
1
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First, the removal of the fertile octogenarian rule has allowed 
the state to further secure future interest beneficiaries’ rights.  At 
common law, the fertile octogenarian rule provides that a person is 
considered capable of bearing a child at any age.5  This rule resulted 
in the invalidation of future interests because of the distant possibility 
that a person may bear a child at an advanced age.6  For the purpose 
of protecting these future interests that would otherwise be invalidat-
ed, New York substituted strict rules of construction by furnishing 
age ranges within which a person shall be considered capable of bear-
ing a child.7  The elimination of the fertile octogenarian rule limits 
invalidation of future interests caused by far-fetched possibilities 
such as childbearing among the elderly.8 
Second, the reduction of the age contingency rule properly 
promotes the testator’s intent because, notwithstanding the age con-
tingency in the conveyance or testamentary instrument, the testator’s 
ultimate purpose, for the beneficiary to receive the property at some 
time, is accomplished.  At common law, if a conveyance or testamen-
tary transfer was created with an age contingency which could be sat-
isfied too remotely, the interest would be invalid.9  New York has al-
leviated this problem by reducing the age contingency to twenty-one 
years.10 
Further, New York’s evolution away from the common law 
has helped to secure a future interest by eliminating the common law 
unborn widow rule.  At common law, if a conveyance or testamen-
tary instrument were made in favor of an unascertainable spouse with 
a remainder to a third person, the spouse could not operate as a life in 
being.11  Abolishing the unborn widow rule is advantageous because 
it effectuates the testator’s intent, under the premise that a testator 
always intends to create a valid instrument. Allowing the unascer-
tainable spouse to operate as a life in being facilitates the validation 
 
5 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 325-26 (1787). 
6 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966) (practice commentary) 
(Margaret Valentine Turano subparagraph E). 
7 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e) (McKinney 1972). 
8 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3 (McKinney 1966) (practice commentary) 
(Margaret Valentine Turano subparagraph E). 
9 The Duke of Norfolk Case, 22 Eng. Rep. at 931. 
10 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
11 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966), construed in 1960 
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), at 18. 
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of the third party’s interest.12 
Furthermore, New York has taken the proper approach de-
parting from the common law in applying the RAP to commercial op-
tion contracts because no persuasive reason exists for the exemption 
of an entire class of future interests from its application.  At common 
law, a commercial option contract was considered exempt from the 
RAP remoteness of vesting application.13  New York has refused to 
exclude this entire class of future interests from the remoteness of 
vesting application.14 
Finally, New York has properly applied the common law by 
not expanding the RAP to leaseholds and rights of first refusal be-
cause these types of contracts do not involve the evils the RAP at-
tempts to prohibit.  At common law, leaseholds and rights of first re-
fusal were exempt from the remoteness of vesting application.15  New 
York has properly excluded theses interests from the application of 
the RAP.16 
This Comment will explore RAP’s common law principles as 
well as the New York modifications of the remoteness of vesting and 
suspension of alienability applications.17  Section II of this Comment 
will delve into the original creation of the RAP as well as its common 
law application.  Section III will explore New York’s codification of 
the common law rule.  Section IV will probe into New York’s minor 
modifications of the common law rule in relation to the fertile octo-
 
12 Id. 
13 See SIMES, supra note 4, at 311-12. 
14 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d 799, 800 (N.Y. 1966). 
15 Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 381 (N.Y. 1986). 
16 Id. 
17 There are two different applications of the RAP codified in New York Estates, Powers, 
and Trusts Law (E.P.T.L.) § 9-1.1.  N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 
1966).  Under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1(a), the New York legislature has codified the 
common law suspension of alienation and remoteness of vesting applications.  Id. 
The absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons 
in being by whom an absolute fee or estate in possession can be con-
veyed or transferred. Every present or future estate shall be void in its 
creation which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation by any 
limitation or condition for a longer period than lives in being at the crea-
tion of the estate and a term of not more than twenty-one years. Lives in 
being shall include a child conceived before the creation of the estate but 
born thereafter. In no case shall the lives measuring the permissible peri-
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genarian rule, the reduction of the age contingency savings provision, 
and the unborn widow rule.  Section V will analyze RAP’s common 
law application to non-commercial option contracts as well as New 
York’s major modification applying the RAP to commercial option 
contracts.  Finally, this Comment will conclude that New York’s 
modifications to the RAP have refined the common law RAP by pre-
serving the underlying purpose of the RAP as well as the intent of 
grantors and testators. 
II. THE COMMON LAW RAP 
RAP originated under the common law in the patriarchal so-
ciety of England.18  Around 1535, King Henry VII put incremental 
pressure on Parliament to enact additional means to derive wealth,19 
which led to the creation of the Statute of Uses.20  The Statute of Uses 
is an “English statute that converted the equitable title held by the 
cestui que use (i.e., beneficiary) to a legal one in order to make the 
cestui que use liable for feudal dues, as only a legal owner.”21  The 
purpose of the statute was to expand future interests by converting 
springing and shifting uses to executory shifting or springing inter-
ests.22  However, the hidden agenda behind the statute’s creation was 
to provide the crown with additional tax revenue.23  In addition to al-
lowing for the collection of increased tax revenue, this initiative led 
to the creation of the Statute of Wills.24  This statute, which allowed 
landowners to pass property at death for the first time, led to the 
RAP’s creation.25  The Statute of Wills established the fundamental 
principle known as freedom of disposition, which permits decedents 
to pass property at death in accordance with their wishes.26  The Stat-
ute of Wills enabled property owners to begin to restrict alienation of 
 
18 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 The Statute of Uses, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
22 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 290. 
23 Jonathan M. Vecchi, Comment, Repulsed by RAP? Renewal Options Are Singing A Dif-




26 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 19 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 9th ed. 2013). 
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their property for generations.27 
RAP has two primary purposes: (1) keeping property market-
able; and (2) limiting dead hand control.28  By limiting the alienation 
restraints on a parcel of property, RAP ensures that the property will 
become marketable within a reasonable period of time from the trans-
fer.29  However, this principle is a double-edged sword.  Estates laws 
attempt to promote freedom of disposition, while at the same time re-
stricting that freedom for community benefit.30  Prior to the creation 
of the RAP, judges in England would often rule contrary to perpetui-
ties in an attempt to limit dead hand control over real and personal 
property.31  In ruling contrary to perpetuities, “[t]he weapon they had 
at hand to oppose perpetuities in the two centuries prior to The Duke 
of Norfolk’s Case was principally destructibility of fee tails by the 
common recovery and of contingent remainders by merger and fail-
ure to vest.”32 
In 1681, The Duke of Norfolk’s Case established the Doctrine 
of Perpetuities, which is still followed by a minority of United States 
jurisdictions today.33  Under this rule, “[n]o interest is good unless it 
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in 
being at the creation of the interest.”34  When determining whether an 
interest is valid under the common law, it must be ascertained pro-
spectively.35  If there is any possibility, no matter how slight, that the 
interest may not vest within the perpetuities period, the interest is in-
valid.36  The primary goal in the creation of the Doctrine of Perpetui-
ties was to strike down dead hand control by invalidating interests 
that may vest too remotely.37  As a general consensus in the legal sys-
 
27 George L. Haskins, Extending The Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections On the Origins 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 20 (1977). 
28 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 880. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See Haskins, supra note 27, at 21. 
32 See id. at 35. 
33 The common law application of RAP is still followed in Arizona, Iowa, Ohio, Oklaho-
ma, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-261 (1963); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
558.68 (West 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
60, § 175.47 (West 1941); Okla. CONST. art. II, § 32; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West 
1972); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.036 (West 1983). 
34 See GRAY, supra note 3, at § 201 (citation omitted). 
35 See SIMES, supra note 4, at 263. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 264. 
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tem, it is desired that wealth flow from the wealthy to the poor, which 
becomes more probable when the law limits perpetual wealth.38 
Equally important, the remoteness of vesting rule usually ap-
plies when a property owner holds his freehold estate in fee simple 
absolute39 and transfers away something less than what he owns.40  
There are many remainders that a property owner can transfer, either 
through an inter vivos or testamentary disposition, when the first 
grantee is not given a fee simple absolute.41  These remainders may 
be indefeasibly vested,42 vested subject to open,43 vested subject to an 
executory limitation,44 or contingent.45  All of these remainders are 
subject to the RAP except indefeasibly vested remainders and vested 
remainders subject to an executory limitation.46  An indefeasibly 
vested remainder is not subject to the RAP due to its vested charac-
teristics.47  A remainder can only be indefeasibly vested if it is “cer-
tain of becoming possessory in the future and cannot be divested.”48   
Moreover, following traditional English common law princi-
ples, a few minor common law doctrines were used to increase the 
alienability of estates and avoid perpetuities; however, these doc-
trines have been abrogated in almost every United States jurisdiction 
today,49 including the Rule in Shelley’s Case,50 the doctrine of the 
 
38 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 20. 
39 A fee simple absolute is a possessory estate that is capable of continuing indefinitely.  
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 216. 
40 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 309-10. 
41 See id. 
42 An indefeasibly vested remainder is a remainder that is certain to come into possession 
at the termination of the preceding estate.  See id. at 281. 
43 A remainder that is vested subject to open is a remainder that is not certain to become 
possessory in a particular person because it is commonly a class gift and the class is not 
closed at that time.  The remainder is subject to partial divestment because as the class ex-
pands a portion of the interest divests from one class member to the other.  See id. at 282. 
44 A vested remainder subject to an executory limitation is a remainder that will divest 
into another transferee upon the occurrence of an event.  The remainder is subject to com-
plete divestment because if an event occurs, a condition subsequent, the interest will entirely 
divest from one interest holder to another.  See id. at 286. 
45 A contingent remainder is a remainder that is either (1) subject to a condition precedent, 
or (2) is given to an unascertained person.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 281. 
46 See id.  Note that the executory interest is subject to RAP. Id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 304-07. 
50 See SIMES, supra note 4, at 45. 
It has come to be recognized that (a) the rule in Shelley’s case affects on-
ly the remainder, and that (b) whether the ancestor has a possessory fee 
6
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Destructibility of Contingent Remainders,51 and the Doctrine of Wor-
thier Title.52 
The common law rule in relation to the remoteness of vesting 
problem can be reduced to one simple rule: “[n]o interest is good un-
less it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some 
life in being at the creation of the interest.”53  Nonetheless, its appli-
cation is one that has perplexed scholars and commentators since its 
creation.  The common law application was indeed useful at the time 
 
simple or fee tail immediately, depends upon the applicability of the doc-
trine of merger. The rule may, therefore, be stated as follows: If a life es-
tate in land is conveyed or devised to A, and by the same conveyance or 
device, a remainder in the same land is limited, mediately, or immediate-
ly, to the heirs of A, or to the heirs of A’s body, and the life estate and 
remainder are of the same quality, then A has a remainder in fee simple 
or in fee tail. 
See id. 
51 See id. at 33. 
According to English common law, a remainder in land must take effect 
in possession at the termination of the prior estate of freehold. But a con-
tingent remainder could not take effect in possession prior to the happen-
ing of the contingency on which it was limited. From these two proposi-
tions may be deduced the destructibility rule, which as follows: If the 
prior estate of freehold terminate before the happening of the contingen-
cy on which a contingent remainder is limited, the remainder can never 
take effect. The rule was so designed because the contingent remainder 
could be destroyed by a premature determination of prior life estate re-
sulting from a forfeiture or a merger. Executory interests were held to be 
indestructible. But a limitation of a contingent remainder could not be 
treated as an executory interest merely because the contingency was not 
vested at the termination of the prior estate of freehold. If, at the incep-
tion of the interest, it appeared that a limitation might take effect as a 
remainder, it was construed as a contingent remainder rather than an ex-
ecutory interest. 
See id. 
52 See id. at 59. 
When the rule applies, the limitation to the heirs is void as a conveyance 
to them and there is a reversionary interest in the grantor. Though the 
limitation is void as such, it may show that the prior interest is a deter-
minable fee and not a fee simple absolute. 
After a grant containing a limitation to the grantor’s heirs has been 
made, a question involving the rule may arise: (a) when the grantor con-
veys or devises his reversionary interest to another; (b) when creditors of 
heirs apparent seek to reach their property; (c) when the termination of a 
trust is sought; and (d) when the applicability of the Federal Estate Tax 
is involved. 
See SIMES, supra note 4, at 59. 
53 See GRAY, supra note 3, at § 201 (citation omitted). 
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of its inception; however, the strict application may yield troubling 
outcomes in contemporary society.  Although New York’s rule is 
analogous to the common law rule, New York has taken many strides 
towards evolving the rule for modern use. 
III. NEW YORK’S CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE 
New York’s codification of the RAP has been said to have 
simply mimicked the common law rule.54  However, this statement is 
misleading because New York has departed from the common law 
application.55  The codification of the common law rule can easily be 
found under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1;56 nonetheless, the applica-
tion of the RAP is not so simple. Under this codification, no convey-
ance of property is valid unless the interest in the property will vest, 
if at all, within twenty-one years after the death of some life in being, 
at the time of the conveyance if it is an irrevocable inter vivos trans-
fer or at the time of death if it is a testamentary transfer.57  This codi-
fication is identical to the common law principle as stated by John C. 
Gray.58 
 
54 See SIMES, supra note 4, at 310-11. 
55 See id. 
56 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1966). 
No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later 
than twenty-one years after one or more lives in being at the creation of 
the estate and any period of gestation involved. In no case shall lives 
measuring the permissible period of vesting be so designated or so nu-
merous as to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult. 
Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See GRAY, supra note 3, at § 201.  However, if the conveyance is in the form of a trust 
that is in favor of a class of persons who are his heirs or next of kin, New York E.P.T.L. § 7-
1.9(b), which incorporates a minor application of the Doctrine of Worthier Title, must be 
applied along with New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1(b).  N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
1.9 (a), (b) (McKinney 1966). 
Upon the written consent, acknowledged or proved in the manner re-
quired by the laws of this state for the recording of a conveyance of real 
property, of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust of property, 
heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such trust may revoke or 
amend the whole or any part thereof by an instrument in writing 
acknowledged or proved in like manner, and thereupon the estate of the 
trustee ceases with respect to any part of such trust property, the disposi-
tion of which has been revoked. If the conveyance or other instrument 
creating a trust of property was recorded in the office of the clerk or reg-
ister of any county of this state, the instrument revoking or amending 
such trust, together with the consents thereto, shall be recorded in the 
8
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IV. NEW YORK’S MINOR MODIFICATIONS OF THE COMMON 
LAW RULE 
New York has made several modifications to the common law 
rule; some of these modifications are minor, while others are consid-
ered major.59  The minor modifications include the removal of the 
fertile octogenarian rule, the adjustment to age contingencies, and the 
elimination of the unborn widow rule.  First, the fertile octogenarian 
rule, at common law, stated that a person was considered capable of 
bearing a child at any age.60  New York has modified this rule to cre-
ate a strict rule of construction limiting childbearing capabilities to 
certain age ranges.61  Second, New York introduced a mechanism to 
modify an age contingency which would otherwise validate the re-
mainder to allow the remainder to definitely vest, if at all, within the 
perpetuities period.62  Third, at common law, when a conveyance was 
made to an unascertainable spouse, that spouse was not considered a 
life in being for purposes of the RAP.63  New York’s modification 
now operates to allow an unascertainable spouse to be considered a 
life in being, which can operate to secure a remainder’s interest that 
would have been invalidated at common law.64 
A. New York’s Modification of the Fertile 
Octogenarian Rule 
New York’s modification of the common law fertile octoge-
narian rule is the first modification that helped New York’s applica-
tion evolve to its modern necessity.  Under common law principles, 
 
same office of every county in which the conveyance or other instrument 
creating such trust was recorded. 
For the purposes of this section, a disposition, contained in a trust creat-
ed on or after September first, nineteen hundred fifty-one, in favor of a 
class of persons described only as the heirs, next of kin or distributees 
(or by any term of like import) of the creator of the trust does not create 
a beneficial interest in such persons. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
59 Although some modifications are more significant than others, they have all meaning-
fully contributed to New York RAP’s evolution away from the common law. 
60 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. at 325-26. 
61 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(1) (McKinney 1972). 
62 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
63 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966), construed in 1960 
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for the purposes of the RAP, a person is considered capable of bear-
ing children regardless of age.65  This concept, known as the fertile 
octogenarian rule, was continued in New York’s original adoption of 
the common law.66  The rule primarily became an issue in transfers of 
life estates that included a living issue contingency.  In Jee v. 
Audley,67 the testator created a testamentary transfer which stated, “I 
g[ive] £1000 to M and the issue of her body, and in default of such 
issue he gave the said £1000 to be equally divided between the 
daughters of then living J[ohn] and E[lizabeth] his wife.”68  At the 
time of T’s death, M had no living issue.69  The words of limitation 
would have previously been recognized as a fee tail in the wife’s 
bloodline.70  In addition to the creation of the fee tail, the testator cre-
ated a contingent gift over.71  As such, if M were to die without issue, 
the property was to be disbursed to the then living issue of John and 
Elizabeth.72  At the time of the litigation, M was nearly seventy years 
old, without issue.73  The issue of John and Elizabeth, who were also 
nearly seventy years old and held the contingent gift over, filed suit 
to secure their contingent interest in the estate.74  The court refused to 
find that, based upon her age, a person should be considered incapa-
ble of bearing a child.  The court stated, 
I am desired to do in this case something which I do 
not feel myself at liberty to do, namely to suppose it 
impossible for persons in so advanced an age as John 
and Elizabeth Jee to have children; but if this can be 
done in one case it may in another, and it is a very 
 
65 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. at 325-26. 
66 Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. Rev. 595, 600 
(2005). 
67 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. at 324. 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 Id. at 324-26. 
70  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 222-23. A fee tail is an estate that gives the 
current possessor a life estate in the property and upon the death of the life estate holder the 
property passes directly to his issue. Id. Each fee tail holder only maintains a life estate 
which is automatically terminated upon his death. Id. Fee tails are no longer used due to the 
ease of manipulation of the estate. Id. For instance, often the present interest holders would 
transfer their fee tail interest to a strawman, who would transfer the property back to the pre-
sent interest holder in a fee simple absolute, destroying the fee tail. Id.  
71 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. at 325. 
72 Id. at 324. 
73 Id. at 324-25. 
74 Id. at 324-26. 
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dangerous experiment and introductive of the greatest 
inconvenience to give a latitude to such sort of conjec-
ture.75 
Thus, the court concluded, due to the adverse effects of such a 
determination, that a court should not decide whether a person is ca-
pable of bearing a child.76  However, New York has taken a converse 
approach, despite the court’s warning.77 
New York has abrogated the common law fertile octogenarian 
rule.78  Under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3(e)(2), a male is only con-
sidered capable of having a child from age fourteen until death.79  
Further, for RAP purposes, a female is only considered capable of 
bearing a child from ages twelve to fifty-five.80  For example, at 
common law, if a testator devised property under a will to his daugh-
ter for life then to her issue, if any, and if no issue then to his son, the 
outcome would depend on whether the daughter was capable of bear-
ing children from the date of the testator’s death, which period would 
run indefinitely.  Thus, the daughter’s age would not make a differ-
ence; the gift over would not vest until the death of the daughter, so 
long as she died with no issue.  In contrast, under New York’s modi-
fication, if the daughter had already surpassed the age of fifty-five, 
the analysis would depend upon whether the gift over interest will 
vest, if ever, immediately, based on whether she has issue at that 
time.  If the daughter had already reached the age of fifty-five and did 
not have issue, the gift over remainder holders may be able to petition 
to immediately vest their interest in the property.  The ability of the 
contingent future interest holders to immediately vest their future in-
terest would allow the remaindermen to have certain rights over the 
current possessor, including applicable uses of the doctrine of 
 
75 Id. at 325-26. 
76 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. at 325-26. 
77 Id. 
78 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e) (McKinney 1972). 
79 Id. § 9-1.3(e)(2). 
Where the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a person 
to have a child at some future time, it shall be presumed, subject to sub-
paragraph (2), that a male can have a child at fourteen years of age or 
over, but not under that age, and that a female can have a child at twelve 
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waste.81 
However, despite converse rights available to future interest 
holders, such as the use of the doctrine of waste, this modification fa-
cilitates RAP’s evolution for the public benefit.  The legislature’s in-
tent in the removal of the fertile octogenarian rule was to avoid inval-
idating dispositions on such “far-fetched” possibilities.82  For 
example, “if a husband with an 80-year old wife created a trust to pay 
income to himself for life, then the income to his wife for life, then 
the income to his children for their lives, remainder to his grandchil-
dren,” the wife’s assumed ability to have issue would have invalidat-
ed the remainder interest to the testator’s grandchildren.83  The wife 
would not be able to operate as a validating life because she is the last 
ascertainable person born at the time of the conveyance.  Therefore, 
there is a possibility that the grandchildren’s remainder would vest 
too remotely because it may vest beyond twenty-one years after her 
death.  To avoid this improbability, the legislature created a presump-
tion that the wife shall not be considered capable of bearing chil-
dren,84 thus, securing the children’s interest in the trust. 
Further, New York’s presumption allows for the early closure 
of a class especially when applying the rule of convenience.85  Ordi-
narily, a class gift cannot close until the interests of all members of 
that class have vested, and the class closes because no new members 
of the class can be born.86  The rule of convenience, which applies to 
class gifts which are vested subject to open, allows the early closure 
of a class, so long as at least one member of the class is capable of 
taking possession, which would exclude members of the class who 
 
81 Affirmative waste occurs when a person with a life estate takes an action that decreases 
the value of the property. Affirmative Waste, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
Permissive waste is when a person with a life estate does not take a necessary action, which 
decreases the value of the property. Permissive Waste, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). Ameliorative waste is when a person with a life estate makes an unauthorized change 
to the property, even though it increases the value of the property. Ameliorative Waste, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The concept of ameliorative waste stems from 
the traditional common law principle that lease holders are not supposed to make any chang-
es, even if it is an investment, to a leasehold.  Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. 
Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 72 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 1995). 
82 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3 (McKinney 1966) (practice commentary) 




86 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 311. 
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were born after its closure.87  This modification operates to allow the 
early closure of a class gift intended for someone’s children.88  For 
example, if a conveyance was made to A’s children who reach the 
age of 25, at common law, the class would not close until A’s death 
because she was capable of having a child at any time during her life; 
however, under New York’s modification, if A, a female, attained the 
age of fifty-five and all the conditions precedent have been satisfied, 
her then living issue would be able to use the rule of convenience to 
close the class early.89  The class would be capable of closing early 
because under New York’s rules of construction, the mother is inca-
pable of bearing a child.90 
Finally, with the increase in artificial reproductive means of 
childbearing, New York has taken a definitive stance to discount 
these possibilities for the RAP and other purposes.91  Under New 
York E.P.T.L. § 4-1.3(h), “[w]here the validity of a disposition under 
the rule against perpetuities depends on the ability of a person to have 
a child at some future time, the possibility that such person may have 
a genetic child shall be disregarded.”92  Even for purposes of inher-
itance, New York has stringently limited when a child can claim a 
testate or intestate share.93  Under New York E.P.T.L. § 4-1.3(b), in 
order for a posthumously conceived child to claim a testate or intes-
tate share, the following must be satisfied: 1) during life the parent 
consented to posthumous conception in a signed writing; and 2) the 
child was in utero not later than 24 months or is born not later than 33 
months after the parent’s death.94 
The abrogation of the common law rule was necessary to al-
low New York to evolve this historic rule to a modern application.  
Under the common law, a wholly unlikely possibility, such as 
childbearing at an elderly age, has the ability to frustrate the grantor’s 
intent.95  The intent of the grantor should always be given the highest 
 
87 See id. 
88 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3 (McKinney 1972) (practice commentary) 
(Margaret Valentine Turano subparagraph C). 
89 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 311. 
90 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e) (McKinney 1972). 
91 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(4) (McKinney 1966). 
92 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(h) (McKinney 2014). 
93 Id.  § 4-1.3(b). 
94 Id. § 4-1.3(b)(4). 
95 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3 (McKinney 1972) (practice commentary) 
(Margaret Valentine Turano subparagraph C). 
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regard, and only be limited when it is necessary for community bene-
fit, which is not applicable in situations when parties are capable of 
having future children.96  Because a grantor’s intent should not be 
frustrated by a remote possibility that the grantor did not contem-
plate, New York has taken the proper step in securing beneficiaries’ 
future interests.  
 
B. New York’s Modification of the Common Law Age 
Contingency Rule 
New York has also modified the common law principles to 
ease RAP’s stringencies by creating a mechanism that automatically 
adjusts otherwise problematic age contingencies under the common 
law RAP.97  A grantor or testator may place an age contingency on a 
conveyance or bequest98 frequently to prevent an immature child 
from receiving a large amount of capital.99  Such an age contingency 
seeks to withhold the bequest or conveyance until the child is of a 
proper age to manage the asset.100  New York’s modification, by re-
ducing the age contingency, allows the RAP application to further 
promote the creator’s intent while still limiting dead hand control.101  
Under the common law, an age contingency is valid unless, as a re-
sult of the contingency, the conveyance is capable of vesting beyond 
the perpetuities period.102  Under the savings provision in E.P.T.L. § 
9-1.2,103 New York provides a mechanism that reduces the age con-
tingency to ensure that the remainder would vest within the perpetui-
ties period.104  Further, under the savings provision, the age contin-
 
96 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 880. 
97 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
98 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 131-32. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
102 The Duke of Norfolk Case, 22 Eng. Rep. at 934. 
103 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
Where an estate would, except for this section, be invalid because made 
to depend, for its vesting or its duration, upon any person attaining or 
failing to attain an age in excess of twenty-one years, the age contingen-
cy shall be reduced to twenty-one years as to any or all persons subject 
to such contingency. 
  Id. 
104 Id. 
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gency will only be reduced if it is needed to secure the conveyance so 
that the rule does not invalidate the conveyance.105 
For example, if the testator conveyed Sepacre to his daughter 
for life, then to her issue who attain the age of thirty and, if none, 
then to X, at common law the remainder would be invalid.  Under the 
common law, the testator’s daughter could die and her children, born 
after the testator’s death, may not satisfy the age contingency of thirty 
within twenty-one years of their mother’s death.  Therefore, the gift 
over to X would immediately vest, which would become possessory 
at the daughter’s death because at that point we would know for cer-
tain if the daughter’s issue’s interest would vest within the perpetui-
ties period.106  When the testator dies, the vesting of the interest will 
be analyzed prospectively based upon whether the interest will defi-
nitely vest, or will never vest, within the perpetuities period.  At 
common law, at the death of the daughter, a life in being,107 if any of 
her issue was younger than nine years old, we could immediately de-
termine that the issue’s interest would never vest within the perpetui-
ties period.  Therefore, at the testator’s death, we would know that it 
is possible for the issue’s interest to vest more than twenty-one years 
after the death of the testator or his daughter.  However, under New 
York’s savings provision, at the testator’s death, so long as the 
daughter had issue, the age contingency of thirty would automatically 
be reduced to twenty-one so that the issue have the ability of meeting 
the age contingency within the perpetuities period.108 
Furthermore, even under New York’s savings provision, if all 
of the issue fail to meet the age contingency within the perpetuities 
period, their interest would never vest, at which point X’s interest in 
the estate would vest.  Consider a testator who transfers Blackacre to 
X for life, then to X’s heirs who attain the age of thirty-one.109  If, at 
 
105 Matter of BNY Mellon, N.A. (Doris), 2 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cty. 2014) 
(construing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966)). 
106 A reversion is an interest that is left with the grantor or testator when he transfers less 
than what he owns.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 277. 
107 A life in being is “[u]nder the rule against perpetuities, anyone alive when a future in-
terest is created, whether or not the person has an interest in the estate.” Life in Being, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
108 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
109 At common law, the Rule in Shelley’s Case would apply and create a remainder in fee 
simple absolute in X. See SIMES, supra note 4, at 45. The doctrine of merger would then ap-
ply and, In order to promote the alienability of estates, the doctrine of merger would then 
apply to merge the smaller interest, the life estate, into the larger estate, the remainder in fee 
simple absolute, giving X a fee simple absolute. Id. 
15
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the time of her death, X, a life in being, has one child Z, who is two 
years old, the savings provision would reduce the age contingency to 
twenty-one so that the interest will vest or fail to vest within the per-
petuities period.  During that period, which will begin prospectively 
at the testator’s death, until Z reaches the age of twenty-one, the 
property would revert back to the testator’s estate, which would hold 
the property subject to a springing executory interest110 in Z.  Howev-
er, if Z dies before she reaches the age of twenty-one, the interest will 
never vest.  In that situation, the executory limitation is eliminated 
and the testator’s estate now holds the estate in fee simple absolute.111  
Thus, this minor modification is advantageous because it furthers the 
intent of the testator or grantor to create a valid interest, and still lim-
its dead hand control.  
New York has codified the savings provision in an attempt to 
further ease the application of the rule to wills and trusts.112  The pri-
mary purpose of the RAP was to further the intent of the testator, 
while promoting the societal interest in limiting dead hand control 
and restraints on alienation.113  Courts always assume that the testator 
intended to create a valid transfer and the goal of the courts in appli-
cation of the rule is to further the intent of the testator.114  This provi-
sion furthers the testator’s intent because the testator created the in-
terest with the intention of the beneficiaries eventually receiving the 
corpus.  If, for whatever reason, an interest improperly has a contin-
gency that may prohibit the interest from ever vesting under the 
common law,115 the savings provision will remove the error in the 
 
110 An executory interest is “[a] future interest held by a third person that either cuts off 
another’s interest or begins after the natural termination of a preceding estate.” Executory 
Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A shifting executory interest is “[a]n 
executory interest that operates in defeasance of an interest created simultaneously in a third 
person.” Shifting Executory Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A spring-
ing executory interest is “[a]n executory interest that operates in defeasance of an interest left 
in the transferor.”  Springing Executory Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
111 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 286. 
112 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966), construed in Matter of 
BNY Mellon, N.A. (Doris), 2 N.Y.S.3d 757 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cty. 2014). 
113 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 880. 
114 See id. 
115 The greatest number of errors comes about when people draft their own documents. 
Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1912 (1986).  
However, the greatest amount of attorney malpractice arises out of RAP issues and even 
some highly respected practitioners draft documents that violate RAP. Id. Due to the com-
plexity of RAP, it is not clear in certain jurisdictions if a malpractice claim can be filed 
against an attorney for creating a document that violates the rule. Id. 
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transfer to allow the beneficiaries to enjoy the estate that they would 
have received absent the contingency.116  The purpose of this modifi-
cation is to promote the testator’s intent by upholding otherwise inva-
lid provisions under the common law application of the RAP.117 
This modification furthers the intent of the RAP because it 
upholds transfers, which would be invalid under the common law, 
notwithstanding any misjudgment of the testator.118  If the testator 
made a disposition in which a contingent interest could vest beyond 
the perpetuities period, the New York modification allows the testa-
tor’s disposition to be valid.119 Therefore, New York has made the 
proper determination in the creation of the savings provision, allow-
ing RAP to evolve to promote the intent of the testator notwithstand-
ing his error.120  This modification is necessary because it promotes 
the testator’s freedom of disposition, with some limitations to further 
community benefit.  
 
C. New York’s Modification of the Unborn Widow 
Rule 
New York has made one final minor modification of the 
common law rule by removing the unborn widow rule, which also 
promotes the grantor’s intent even when he failed to contemplate that 
his spouse may change over time.121  At common law, if the grantor 
were to create a contingent interest in an unascertainable spouse with 
a contingent gift over, the contingent interest would be invalid.122  
New York’s elimination of the unborn widow rule, codified in New 
York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3(c), presumes that a surviving spouse was alive 
at the time of the transfer.123  For example, if the grantor made a con-
 





121 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966). 
122 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966), construed in 1960 
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), at 18. 
123 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966). 
Where an estate would, except for this paragraph, be invalid because of 
the possibility that the person to whom it is given or limited may be a 
person not in being at the time of the creation of the estate, and such per-
son is referred to in the instrument creating such estate as the spouse of 
17
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veyance “to X for life, then to X’s spouse for life, then to such of the 
grantor’s issue as shall survive X’s spouse,” under the common law 
the gift over would be invalid.124  In this example, X’s spouse has a 
contingent remainder for life because she is an unascertainable par-
ty.125  At common law, this conveyance would fail because of the 
possibility that the grantor would lose his spouse, either through 
death or divorce, and remarry a person who may not have been born 
at the time of the conveyance.126  Because the spouse is an unascer-
tainable party, the last life in being would be X.  After all, there is a 
possibility that the spouse had not been born at the time of the con-
veyance, and would survive the grantor and X by more than twenty-
one years.  Therefore, the interest of the grantor’s issue may not vest 
within twenty-one years of X’s death.  Due to these possibilities, the 
common law invalidates the remainder to the grantor’s issue.127  Con-
sequently, after the death of X’s spouse, the property would revert 
back to the grantor or the grantor’s estate, if he is deceased. This 
problem is avoided at common law in cases where a grantor identifies 
a specific spouse who was alive at the time of the transfer.128  New 
York, however, has provided a remedy for this problem. 
Under New York’s codification, it is presumed that the person 
referred to as a spouse in an instrument is a life in being, regardless 
of whether the spouse is ascertainable at the time of the transfer.129  
Under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3(b), courts shall presume that the 
creator intended creating a valid transfer.130  A grantor, who conveys 
an interest to his or her spouse, is unlikely to anticipate the possibility 
that the spouse was not born as of the date of the transfer.131  Further, 
when a grantor creates a conveyance, he does not necessarily intend a 
 
another without other identification, it shall be presumed that such refer-
ence is to a person in being on the effective date of the instrument. 
     Id. 
124 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966), construed in 1960 
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), at 18. 
125 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 281. 
126 N.Y EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966), construed in 1960 
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), at 18. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1966). 
130 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 1966). 
131 Revocation, NATIONAL PARALEGAL COLLEGE, 
http://nationalparalegal.edu/willsTrustsEstates_Public/ConstructionofWills/Revocation.asp 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
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substitution of the spouse whom he originally considered in the con-
veyance.132  Marital relationships, especially in blended families, can 
take many forms and it is impracticable to expect a testator to rewrite 
all of his testamentary documents in the instance of a change of that 
relationship.133  The grantor most likely intended the estate to transfer 
to his current spouse upon his death with a remainder to others – 
most possibly his issue.  New York has properly modified the rule 
because it operates to secure the remainder’s interest.  This change is 
beneficial because it would avoid the spouse’s receiving the property 
outright as a reversion in violation of the testator’s intent. If the is-
sue’s remainder interest violates RAP under the common law unborn 
widow rule and the spouse is the residuary beneficiary, the spouse 
would obtain a fee interest in the property.  There are many reasons 
that a grantor may not want his spouse to hold his estate in fee simple 
absolute after his death, especially if the spouse has children from a 
different marriage.  The testator might be attempting to protect his 
own issue’s interest by ensuring that his spouse’s issue from a prior 
marriage do not receive a portion of his estate.  The testator may also 
be attempting to prevent his new spouse from being able to claim any 
right to his estate.134  While the testator had the option to re-write his 
testamentary documents in the instance of a divorce, the testator may  
assume that the divorce would operate by law to remove the divorced 
spouse from the document because revocation by operation of law 
does not apply in all situations.135 
This modification supports the policy that a grantor’s inten-
tions in the creation of a conveyance should be followed whenever it 
is possible and just to do so.136  New York has taken a proper ap-
proach in promoting the testator’s intent, notwithstanding an error in 
 
132 Id. 
133 Gretchen Livingston, It’s no longer a ‘Leave It to Beaver’ world for American Fami-
lies – but it wasn’t, back then, either, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/30/its-no-longer-a-leave-it-to-beaver-world-
for-american-families-but-it-wasnt-back-then-either/. 
134 This premise can be found in multiple areas of codified law.  Under New York Domes-
tic Relations Law § 248, a court retains the ability to suspend or modify a spousal support 
order, upon that spouse’s either cohabitating with another person, holding himself or herself 
out as the spouse of another, or remarrying.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 2016). 
135 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (amended 1997), 2 U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1995); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4(a) (McKinney 2008).  When a spouse makes a bequest to his 
or her spouse, divorces that spouse and does not revoke his bequest to that spouse, the be-
quest is revoked by operation of law, unless the intent of the testator is to the contrary.  Id. 
136 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 19. 
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his creation of an interest.  This modification allows New York’s ap-
plication to evolve to a modern application, particularly as it has be-
come more common for individuals to remarry, and thereby intend to 
substitute a new spouse in place of a former spouse in their testamen-
tary documents.137  Therefore, this modification is advantageous be-
cause it promotes the testator’s intent, which may become more diffi-
cult to determine with the ever-increasing divorce rate, by presuming 
that the testator or grantor intended to make a valid transfer.138 
V. NEW YORK’S MAJOR MODIFICATIONS OF THE COMMON 
LAW RULE 
A. Option Contract Application 
New York first adopted the RAP’s suspension of the power of 
alienation prong in 1830, which eventually led to the New York 
Court of Appeals applying this rule to option contracts.139  However, 
the original landscape was different from what is codified in the 
E.P.T.L. today.140  Under the original codification, the perpetuities 
period was two lives in being plus the actual periods of minority.141  
In 1958, the New York legislature modified the codification to the 
rule that is applied today.142  This modification restored the common 
law rule that the measuring period for remoteness of vesting is a life 
in being at the creation of the interest plus twenty-one years.143  Tra-
ditionally, New York’s approach was never as broad as the common 
law approach.144  Instead, New York’s statute only applied to certain 
estates and excluded others; for example, New York’s RAP did not 
apply to non-commercial option contracts.145  However, a further 
amendment in 1965 expressed the legislature’s intent to eliminate 
remoteness of vesting issues, when parties would suspend vesting of 
 
137 See Livingston, supra note 133; Ami Sedghi & Simon Rogers, Divorce rates data, 
1858 to now: how has it changed?, THEgUARDIAN, (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jan/28/divorce-rates-marriage-ons. 
138 Id.; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 1966). 
139 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d 799, 803 (N.Y. 1996). 
140 See SIMES, supra note 4, at 310-11. 
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estates for excessive periods. 146  The legislature made it clear that 
New York’s re-codification was to encompass the aspects of the tra-
ditional common law application.147 
Prior to 1965, the Court of Appeals of New York held that an 
option contract148 with an indefinite use period did not violate the 
codified RAP in New York.149  However, the decision in Water Front 
on Upper N.Y. Bay, in Borough of Richmond, City of N.Y.150 only 
contemplated the issue of suspension of alienation; it did not address 
remoteness of vesting.151  Nonetheless, this decision predated the leg-
islative modification of E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1 in 1965.152 
At common law, the RAP may be applied to non-commercial 
option contracts.153  However, New York was originally reluctant to 
apply the rule that it has so broadly expanded.154  It was not until 
1982, in the case of Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy,155 that the New 
York Court of Appeals first expanded the RAP remoteness of vesting 
application to non-commercial option contracts.156  In this case, the 
defendant had an irrevocable option that allowed him to purchase all 
or any part of a twenty-foot strip of land that ran along the southern 
border of his property.157  The defendant had the right to exercise this 
option at any time upon thirty days’ notice given to the plaintiff.158  
This option was to run indefinitely and transfer to any “heirs, execu-
tors, administrators, and assigns of the parties hereto.”159 
In Buffalo Seminary, the court held that an option to purchase 
a parcel of property in the non-commercial setting must only be ca-
 
146 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 803. 
147 Id. 
148 An option contract is either an implied or express contract that requires the parties to 
keep an offer open for a period of time.  During that time the offer cannot be revoked or re-
scinded.  Option Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
149 In re Water Front on Upper N.Y. Bay, In Borough of Richmond, City of N.Y., 157 
N.E. 911, 920 (N.Y. 1927). 
150 157 N.E. 911 (N.Y. 1927). 
151 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 457, 463 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1982), 
aff’d, 447 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1983). 
152 In re Water Front on Upper N.Y. Bay, In Borough of Richmond, City of N.Y., 157 N.E. 
911. 
153 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
154 Id. 
155 451 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1982), aff’d, 447 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1983). 
156 Id. at 465. 
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pable of being exercised within twenty-one years of its creation.160  
The court reasoned that an option that has the ability to run for an in-
definite period constitutes a remoteness of vesting issue but not a 
suspension problem.161 
Under the New York E.P.T.L., the RAP has two different ap-
plications: one for remoteness of vesting problems and the other for 
suspension of alienation problems.162  A remoteness of vesting prob-
lem relates to the interest’s inability to vest in either possession or in-
terest within the perpetuities period, which at the common law was 
life plus twenty-one years.163  The suspension of alienation issue re-
lates to the grantor’s suspending the estate holder’s ability to freely 
transfer the property in fee simple for longer than the perpetuities pe-
riod–life in being plus twenty-one years.164  Both of these applica-
tions, although different, were created in an attempt to promote the 
same public policy and to stimulate the alienation of estates.165 
In the codification of the New York RAP, the legislature in-
tended to implement the common law rule as written by Gray.166  
Under the common law, the remoteness of vesting application was 
used for non-commercial option contracts.167  In Buffalo Seminary, 
the court relied on Railway v. Gomm,168 in which the court stated, 
“since an unlimited option to purchase is substantially the same as a 
conditional limitation, which is within the rule, it should therefore be 
subject to the rule against remoteness of vesting,” even though the 
court in Buffalo Seminary relied on the remoteness of vesting applica-
tion rather than the suspension of alienability application.169  The 
court reasoned that it would be an improper application of common 
law future interest law to exclude an entire class of future interests 
from the RAP.170  Thus, the court determined that the New York leg-
islature intended to align the New York rule with common law prin-
 
160 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 465. 
161 Id. at 459.   This was an unusual application of RAP because commonly an option 
which had the ability to run for an indefinite period constituted a suspension of the power of 
alienation violation and not a remoteness of vesting violation. 
162 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1966). 
163 Id. at § 9-1.1(b). 
164 Id. at § 9-1.1(a)(2).  See supra notes 26- 30 and accompanying text. 
165 See Gray, supra note 3, at § 2.1. 
166 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
167 London and Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882). 
168 Id. 
169 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
170 Id. 
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ciples, subject to a few carved out exceptions that New York has cre-
ated.171 
The decision in Buffalo Seminary was not surprising because 
RAP traditionally applied to non-commercial option contracts.172  
However, fourteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals took a 
large leap in furthering the application of the rule in Symphony Space 
v. Pergola Properties.173  In 1996, the court in Symphony Space held 
that New York’s codification of RAP in relation to remoteness of 
vesting applies to both non-commercial and commercial option con-
tracts.174 
In this case, Symphony Space purchased a large property in 
New York City from Broadwest at a depreciated value.175  The prop-
erty, then held by Symphony, was leased back to Broadwest except 
for the theater portion that Symphony retained.176  The property was 
transferred to Symphony, a non-profit organization, in order to take 
advantage of its tax-exempt status.177  As part of the sales agreement, 
Broadwest maintained the option to buy back the property for the 
purchase price, which could only be exercised in 1987, 1993, 1998, 
or 2003.178  Pergola, Broadwest’s successor, notified Symphony of its 
intent to exercise the option in 1985; however, Symphony sought a 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 461. 
173 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1966). 
174 Id. at 800; see id. at 805 (stating that an indefinite use period in an option contract shall 
be treated similarly to a class gift, an all or nothing approach, if one of the options is invalid, 
they all must be invalid). 
175 Id. at 800. 
176 Id. at 800-01. 
177 Id. at 801. 
178 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 801. Further, this option consti-
tuted a covenant that was to run with the land and transfer to any of Broadwest’s heirs, suc-
cessors, or assignees. Id. Subsequently, Broadwest sold its interests in the property as well as 
the option contract to Pergola Properties.  Id. at 802.  A covenant is an agreement recorded 
on the deed of a parcel of property that requires the deed holders to either perform or refrain 
from performing some action. Id. Although a covenant is a recordable interest, it may still be 
valid if it is not recorded. Id. The requirements for a valid covenant change, depending on 
whether the benefit or the burden is running against the party. Symphony Space v. Pergola 
Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 802. If the burden is running against the party, the following re-
quirements must be satisfied: intent, horizontal privity of estate between the covenantor and 
covenantee, vertical privity of estate between the original covenantor and his or her succes-
sors, it must touch and concern the land, and notice. Id. If the benefit is running against the 
party, only the following requirements must be satisfied: intent, some vertical privity of es-
tate between the covenantee and successors, and it must touch and concern the land.  See 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 894-95. 
23
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declaratory judgment action to enjoin Pergola from exercising its op-
tion under the contract, under the theory that the option contract vio-
lated the RAP’s remoteness of vesting principle.179 
Prior to Symphony Space, it had already been established that 
New York accepted the common law rule applying the RAP to non-
commercial options.180  According to the court, it was clear from the 
legislature’s intent to adopt the common law application that the RAP 
was to apply to commercial option contracts.181  The court stated that 
the legislature feared that failing to apply remoteness of vesting to 
commercial option contracts would remove an entire class of contin-
gent future interests from the rule’s application.182  The primary goal 
through this legislative action was to align New York’s rule with that 
of the common law and to promote alienability of all estates, no mat-
ter if they were commercial or personal.183  Restricting the alienabil-
ity of a commercial property may have a severe detrimental effect on 
the property owner’s decision on upkeep.184  If a commercial option 
contract were allowed to run indefinitely, or for a long period of time, 
the property owner would be less incentivized to invest any capital 
into the property due to the possibility of forfeiture.185  Applying the 
RAP to commercial options reduces the period of time in which a 
property may be forfeited, at least in part, reducing the disincentive 
of the property owner to invest capital into the property.186  Thus, 
New York has taken the proper step in the creation of this modifica-
tion from the common law because it further promotes the common 
law principles by eliminating contingencies that may vest too remote-
ly. 
Further, the court in Symphony Space refused to invoke the 
savings provisions codified under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3 to rec-
tify an option contract that may vest beyond twenty-one years.187  The 
 
179 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 802. 
180 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63.  Under the Restatement (First) 
of Property § 401, RAP was not applied to contractual obligations because RAP “has as its 
sole objective the prevention of ‘inconvenient fetterings of property’. . . [w]hen a transaction 
is ‘exclusively contractual’ . . . it involves no fettering of any property . . . .”  RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 401 cmt. a (1944). 
181 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
182 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 804-05. 




187 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 806-07. 
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rules of construction in New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3 govern all appli-
cations of the RAP unless the creator’s intentions were contrary to 
that statutory section.188  Under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3(b), “[i]t 
shall be presumed that the creator intended the estate to be valid.”189  
Further, under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.3(d), “it shall be presumed 
that the creator of such estate intended such contingency [if any] to 
occur, if at all, within twenty-one years from the effective date of the 
instrument creating such estate.”190  New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.2, 
which reduces the age contingency, when necessary, could be used to 
validate the option contracts;191 however, in Symphony Space, the 
court chose not to apply this mechanism.192  This statute is commonly 
invoked for age restrictions but it is not limited to a person’s age.193  
These provisions are merely rules of construction that require courts 
reviewing deeds, wills and trusts “to avoid constructions that frustrate 
the parties’ intended purpose.”194 
The savings provisions do not permit courts to rewrite agree-
ments; they only permit courts to enforce agreements when it appears 
as though the parties’ intent in the creation of the agreement was to 
comply with the RAP.195  In order for the court to apply the savings 
provision, in an attempt to validate the interest, the parties’ intent that 
the option should last no more than twenty-one years must be clear.196  
The savings provision operates to reduce an age contingency, to pro-
mote the intent of the testator or grantor, notwithstanding his error in 
the document.197  In order to apply the provision, it must be clear that 
the grantor intended to create an interest that was exercisable within 
the perpetuities period.198  However, when the parties’ agreement 
does not include a limitation on the duration or an extended option 
period, it is assumed that they intended the option to be exercisable 
 
188 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(a) (McKinney 1966). 
189 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 1966). 
190 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(d) (McKinney 1966). 
191 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 807. 
192 Id. 
193 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1966). 
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either indefinitely or for an extended period.199  The absence of such 
a term suggests the parties purposely created an ambiguous exercisa-
ble term that could be exercised at any time.200  Furthermore, when 
the parties create an agreement whereby the option can be exercised 
beyond twenty-one years, it is also clear they intended allowing the 
option to be exercised beyond twenty-one years.201  Thus, since it is 
clear that the parties intended the exercisable period to be indefinite 
from their open ended term, the savings provision cannot be applied 
to validate the option contract with an indefinite exercise period.202 
New York is among a small minority of jurisdictions that ap-
plies the RAP to commercial options.203 Although New York’s ap-
proach has been widely criticized, this criticism lacks merit.204  Some 
jurisdictions,205 taking a different approach to the RAP by enacting 
the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP), do not 
apply the RAP to commercial options.206  Subjecting options to the 
RAP gives the optionors the ability to escape bad deals, commonly 
when market fluctuations change the value of the property, claiming 
that the option violates the RAP.207 As stated by Jesse Dukeminier, 
Options reasonably limited in time pose no threat to 
the public welfare; in fact, they are useful in facilitat-
ing the development of land. No good reason appears 
why a court should save an unlimited option to pur-
chase by holding that the parties intended the option to 
be exercised within a reasonable time, which is neces-
 
199 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 807. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See supra note 174 (comparing an indefinite option agreement to a class gift, applying 
the same class gift principles). 
203 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1908-09; Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 
669 N.E.2d at 801. 
204 See id. 
205 The minority of jurisdictions that apply USRAP are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah.  
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 331. 
206 “Under USRAP, all interests are valid for 90 years after creation . . . . At the end of 90 
years, any interest that has not vested is reformed by the court as to best carry out the inten-
tion of the long-dead settlor.”  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 894; See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (WILLS & DON. TRANS.) § 27.3 (stating that commer-
cial options are not subject to USRAP); See also supra note 3 (elaborating on other ap-
proaches). 
207 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1909. 
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sarily less than twenty-one years.208 
 
For example, if X purchased a commercial office building from Z, 
which included an option agreement whereby Z had the ability to 
purchase back the property from X at any time within 90 years of the 
purchase, for the purchase price, so long as 90 days’ notice is given, 
an issue may arise.  If Z attempted to exercise his option X can claim 
that this contract violates the RAP, if it benefits him.  If, after the 
purchase, property values in the area rose resulting in a 30% increase 
in the value of the property subject to the option, Z would more than 
likely exercise his option to claim a financial gain if he were to then 
re-sell the property.  The RAP would invalidate this option agreement 
because enforcement of this contract would substantially harm and 
frustrate X’s purchase of the property.  If the option was limited to 
only twenty-one years, X’s purchase of the property may still be frus-
trated by Z’s election of his option; however, at least in that situation, 
frustration of his purchase would only last for a limited time.  During 
the time that his purchase may be frustrated, X could limit the 
amount of capital invested into the property because of the possibility 
of forfeiture. 
New York slowly came into compliance with the common 
law rule in 1982 in the case of Buffalo Seminary.209  However, New 
York took the remoteness of vesting provision one step further, ap-
plying it not only to personal option contracts but also to commercial 
option contracts.210  The Restatement (First) of Property § 393 states: 
[T]he limitation of an option in favor of a class of a 
person other than the conveyor is invalid because of 
the rule against perpetuities. . . [if] such option (a) 
may continue for a longer period than the one de-
scribed in § 374; and (b) would create an interest in 
land, or in some unique thing other than land, but for 
the rule against perpetuities.211 
 
208 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1909 (citation omitted). 
209 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
210 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 800. 
211 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 393 (1944).  According to the Restatement 
(First) of Property § 374, 
the maximum period allowed under the [RAP] is (a) lives of a person 
who are (i) in being at the commencement of such period, and (ii) neither 
so numerous nor so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be 
27
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However, this section, which was drafted by the ALI, even 
under the common law, was not construed to include commercial op-
tions in the RAP’s application.212 
Applying RAP to option contracts operates as an advantage 
over the common law rule, which does not apply the RAP to com-
mercial options, because, as Jesse Dukeminier stated, “[n]o good rea-
son appears why a court should save an unlimited option. . . .”213  At 
common law, optionees would not be protected;214 however, no per-
suasive reason supports an exception for the commercial setting.215  
Therefore, New York has properly expanded the common law rule by 
applying the RAP to commercial option contracts.  States that contin-
ue to follow the common law rule should contemplate adopting New 
York’s approach to option contracts. 
B. Leaseholds and Rights of First Refusal 
New York has not applied RAP to all types of option con-
tracts and related interests.216  The legislature did not intend by codi-
fying the common law application to encompass all option contracts 
regarding estates.217  In 1986, the Court of Appeals in Metropolitan 
Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Corp.218 held that this expansion of New 
York’s RAP in relation to commercial options does not apply to right 
of first refusal contracts.219  The court determined that the different 
attributes of an option contract and a right of first refusal are so ap-
parent that the rule does not apply to the latter.220  An option contract, 
in effect, forces the current owner to sell the property to the party 
with the option at that party’s discretion, while a right of first refusal 
 
unreasonably difficult to obtain; and (b) twenty-one years; and (c) any 
period or periods of gestation involved in the situation to which the limi-
tation applies. 
Id. at § 374. 
212 See supra note 180 (stating the Restatement (First) of Property’s rationale for not ap-
plying RAP to commercial options). 
213 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1909. 
214 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
215 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1909. 
216 See generally Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs, 808 F. Supp. at 1012; Bleecker 
Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011). 
217 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 803. 
218 492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1986). 
219 Id. at 385. 
220 Id. at 383. 
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does not give the holder of the preemptive right the ability to force a 
property owner to sell his or her property.221  The preemptive right 
merely requires the property owner, when selling the property, to of-
fer the property to the party with the preemptive right, prior to open-
ing the property to the market.222  However, this preemptive right 
may never be exercised if the current owner decides not to sell the 
property.  Bruken further discussed the legislature’s intent in the cod-
ification of New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1.223  The legislature intended to 
invalidate interests that would operate as a disincentive on the part of 
property owners to invest capital in their property.224  The right of 
first refusal, unlike an option contract, does not create a disincentive 
for property owners to invest capital into their estates.225  In addition, 
the court in Symphony Space noted the differences between an option 
contract and a right of first refusal contract.226 
Further, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs.,227 held 
that an indefinite option in a lease agreement that allows a landlord to 
reclaim property is not subject to New York’s RAP.228  In 1968, Lat-
ham Sparrowbush Associates (Latham), under a blanket lease, leased 
a garden complex to Shaker Estates, Inc.229  The lease was for a term 
of twenty-one years plus three days with a further option to extend 
the lease for two consecutive periods of twenty-one years upon expi-
ration.230  In 1973, Shaker Estates, Inc. sold its interest in the lease to 
Cohoes Industrial Terminal.231  As part of this purchase, Leon Baker 
acquired the equitable right to the property.232  Under the original 
lease terms, Latham retained an option to terminate the lease agree-
ment at any time on sixty days’ notice and a payment to the lessee in 




223 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1966). 
224 Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Corp., 492 N.E.2d at 382. 
225 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs, 808 F. Supp. at 1012. 
226 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 805. 
227 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs, 808 F. Supp. at 992. 
228 Id. at 1012. 
229 Id. at 995-96. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 996. 
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tent to exercise the option to terminate the lease.234  At that time, 
Baker filed suit to enjoin Latham from exercising its option, claiming 
that the option was invalid under New York’s RAP.235 
In this case of first impression in New York, Baker claimed 
that this suspension of alienation problem was similar to the issue in 
Buffalo Seminary, implying that the Courts holding in that case 
should govern the court’s decision.236  To determine whether the RAP 
invalidated the exercise of the option to terminate the lease, the court 
needed to identify the type of interest each party held in the proper-
ty.237  The option holder in Buffalo Seminary held an unlimited option 
to purchase the parcel of land in fee simple.238  The effect of a re-
straint on the alienation of property is quite different when the land-
lord has an option to re-claim his property rather than when the op-
tion holder has the right to purchase property in fee simple.239  When 
a lessor exercises his right to terminate the leasehold, the lessee is 
losing property in which he never held a fee interest.  However, when 
an optionee exercises his right under an option contract, this election 
may frustrate the optionee’s use and purchase of the property, be-
cause the optionee more than likely intended eventually having the 
property in fee simple.  A lessee would have been aware that he never 
could have received the property in fee simple from that transaction. 
Latham claimed that it had a reversionary interest in the prop-
erty, while Bush claimed that Latham’s interest was executory.240  
The classification of the interest would determine whether the rule 
applied.  If the court determined that Latham’s interest was rever-
sionary, then the RAP would not apply to the interest.241  A reversion, 
an interest a grantor retains in his property, is a vested interest and 
would not be subject to RAP. 242  However, if the court determined 
that the interest was executory, the rule would apply and a different 




236 Id. at 1006. 
237 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1006-07. 
238 Id. at 1006. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 1007. 
241 Id. 
242 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1007; See DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 281 (stating the characteristics of an indefeasibly vested remainder). 
243 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1007. 
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The court concluded that classifying Latham’s interest as ex-
ecutory would be an improper application of common law future in-
terests.244  An executory interest is an interest that can only be held by 
a transferee, not a transferor.245  The proper classification of the trans-
feror’s interest would be a reversion.246  Latham created the lease in 
which he transferred an estate, less than what he held, for a term of 
years, subject to an elective right.247  Latham, holding the property in 
fee simple absolute, transferred a term of years that was subject to a 
conditional limitation, the early election.248  Upon the election of this 
option, the term of years would terminate early and the transferor 
would reclaim the property.249  Thus, Latham held a reversionary in-
terest that, under the common law, was not subject to the RAP due to 
its vested characteristics.250 
However, the court did not conclude that by classifying the 
interests as reversionary, the lease options are not subject to the RAP 
as the Restatement (Second) states.251  Nonetheless, section 394 of 
the Restatement (First) may apply RAP to lease options:252 
Subject to the exceptions stated in §§ 373 (destructible 
interest), 397 (charity) and 400 (unissued shares of a 
corporation), the reservation of an option to repur-
chase the whole or any part of the interest conveyed, 
made in favor of the conveyor, is invalid, because of 
the rule against perpetuities, when, under the language 
and circumstances of the reservation, such option (a) 
may continue for a period longer than the maximum 
period described in § 374; and (b) would create an in-
terest in land or in some unique thing other than land, 
but for the rule against perpetuities.253 
Comment a to section 394 states, 
 




248 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1008. 
249 Id. at 1008-09. 
250 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 276-77. 
251 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1009. 
252 Id.  The Restatement (Second) of Property states that “[a] landlord-tenant relationship 
may be created to endure for any fixed or computable period of time.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.4 (1977). 
253 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1009. 
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When such an option to repurchase is reserved by the 
conveyor of an estate for years in excess of twenty-
one years an additional reason for the rule here stated 
exists. The permitting of such an option would de-
crease the likelihood of the lessee making the invest-
ments in structures on the leased premises normally 
contemplated by the parties to a long term lease.254 
These portions of the Restatement suggest that RAP should 
apply to leaseholds.  Nonetheless, the court could not make a disposi-
tive determination that lease options were subject to the RAP based 
on the reiteration of the Restatement.255  In these two excerpts, the 
American Law Institute attempted to persuade practitioners, scholars, 
and courts that lease options, when the lessor holds an elective right, 
should be subject to the RAP.256  The Restatement provides that a 
lease option with an elective right, similar to an option contract, cre-
ates a disincentive on the lessee to invest capital into the leased prop-
erty.257  However, these views are persuasive in nature, and apparent-
ly no court has understood these characterizations of the common law 
rule to render the RAP applicable to lease options.258 
Further, the court concluded that applying the RAP to lease 
options would be inconsistent with the overall purpose of the com-
mon law rule.259  The primary purpose of this doctrine was to termi-
nate dead hand control over estates to promote the marketability of 
property.260  By preventing this control, the RAP protects the public’s 
interest in land by attempting to limit perpetual wealth of upper class 
families.261  A landlord’s option to terminate a lease upon a given 
consideration does not share in the traditional evils that the rule at-
tempted to prevent.262  It is true, as with any option, the party that is 
in current possession of the property would be less incentivized to in-
vest capital into the property due to the risk of forfeiture. Neverthe-
less, this concern is not as relevant in leaseholds because, under the 
 
254 Id. at 1010. 
255 Id. 
256 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 394 (1944). 
257 Id. 
258 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1010. 
259 Id. at 1011. 
260 Id. 
261 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 880. 
262 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1012. 
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common law theory of ameliorative waste, a tenant was prohibited 
from altering the premises.263  This common law principle is still en-
couraged under New York law.264  Therefore, the court concluded 
that a landlord’s option to terminate a lease at will is a reversionary 
interest that is not subject to the RAP.265 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in Bleecker Street Tenants 
Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC266 held that a commercial option to re-
new a lease that runs appurtenant to the lease is not subject to the re-
moteness of vesting application of the RAP.267  In this case, the plain-
tiff owned Bleecker Street Tenants Corp., a six-story walkup building 
on Bleecker Street in Manhattan.268  The defendant, Bleeker Jones, 
LLC, leased a first-floor commercial space from the plaintiff, with an 
initial lease term of fourteen years.269  As part of this lease, the tenant 
had nine consecutive renewal options to renew the lease for a ten-
year period.270  Each renewal option was to “commence on the first 
day of the calendar month immediately following the expiration of 
the immediate preceding term of this lease.”271  The lessee could ex-
ercise the renewal option six months prior to the expiration of the 
previous lease term.  Each renewal was to remain in effect until the 
lessee notified the lessor within six months of the intent to vacate.272  
Furthermore, if the lessee failed to renew the lease, the lessee main-
tained the right to retain the leased property as a month-to-month ten-
ant.273 
In August 1997, the initial fourteen-year lease term expired 
and Bleeker Jones, LLC, did not exercise its right to renew the lease; 
instead, it continued as a month-to-month tenant.274  Shortly thereaf-
ter, Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. filed suit seeking to void the lease 





266 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011). 
267 Id. at 487. 
268 Id. at 484. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
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newal option violated the RAP’s remoteness of vesting application.275  
Bleeker Jones, LLC contended that the renewal option was appurte-
nant to the lease, which would not make the option subject to the 
RAP under the common law or Symphony Space.276 
The court stated that the decision in Symphony Space made it 
clear that options appurtenant or appendant to a lease are not subject 
to the remoteness of vesting application of the RAP.277  The court 
reasoned that if the option “originate[s] in one of the lease provisions, 
is not exercisable after [the] lease expiration, and is incapable of sep-
aration from the lease” it is not subject to RAP.278  If the option to re-
new the lease is interwoven within the lease, the option is not subject 
to the remoteness of vesting application of RAP.279 
Such options appurtenant to the lease do not implicate the 
evils that the RAP attempted to limit.280  Since option holders have 
the ability to maintain the property for a significant period of time, 
they would not have the incentive to invest capital into the proper-
ty.281  An option that runs appurtenant to a lease “lacks the power to 
divest title of that property to the option holder.”282 
Thus, the court concluded that since appurtenant lease options 
do not produce the traditional evils that the RAP intended to prevent, 
commercial lease renewal options are not subject to the RAP.283  Fur-
ther, the court made clear that this result is consistent with the com-
mon law.284  Because these appurtenant options do not create a disin-
centive for the option holder to invest capital into the property285 and 
do not restrain its alienation, New York has properly refused to apply 
RAP to appurtenant option agreements.286 New York has taken the 
proper approach by refusing to apply the expanded principles from 
Symphony Space to leaseholds and rights of first refusal.287 The evils 
 
275 Id. 
276 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 486. 
277 Id. at 486; see Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828, 834-35 (N.Y. 1992) 
(holding that a right of first refusal to purchase chattels is not subject to RAP). 
278 Id. (citation omitted). 
279 Id. at 487. 
280 Id. at 487. 
281 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 486-87. 
285 Id. at 487. 
286 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
287 The court in Symphony Space made it clear that because an option contract and a right 
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that the common law rule attempted to prohibit are not present in 
these types of provisions.288  Therefore, the court’s refusal to expand 
the Symphony Space holding has furthered the common law princi-
ples of the RAP, which has allowed for the proper evolution of the 
application in New York. 
C. New York’s Codification of Option Contract 
Application: Proposed Enactment of New York 
Estate Powers and Trusts Law § 9-1.9 – The Rule’s 
Applicability to Option Contracts 
New York has codified nearly all of its RAP applications; 
however, the legislature has yet to codify its application to commer-
cial options, non-commercial options, leaseholds, and rights of first 
refusal.289  The legislature has left the court’s jurisprudence in place 
for future application to new issues.  In order to promote predictabil-
ity and provide guidance, the legislature should codify these rulings 
of the New York Court of Appeals.  Due to the complexities of this 
rule, the legislature should provide commentary for its codification. 
i. Proposed Enactment of New York Estates, 
Powers, and Trusts Law § 9-1.9(a) – The 
Applicability to Non-Commercial Option 
Contracts 
The New York legislature should codify the Court of Ap-
peals’ holding in Buffalo Seminary that an indefinite use period of a 
non-commercial option violates the RAP remoteness of vesting ap-
plication.290 
The legislation should state: the remoteness of vesting princi-
ple that is defined under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1(b) is applicable 
to a non-commercial option contract to purchase land.  For the pur-
poses of determining a life in being, the calculation of twenty-one 
years will begin from the date the option is created.  Because the op-
tion does not relate to a life in being, the interest should be required 
 
of first refusal have different attributes, RAP should not apply to the latter.  Symphony Space 
v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 803. 
288 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
289 See generally N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §§ 9-1.1 – 9-1.8 (McKinney 1966) (show-
ing the different RAP codifications in New York). 
290 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
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to be exercised within twenty-one years of its creation.  If the op-
tionor creates multiple dates in which the option can be exercised, it 
shall be treated similarly to a class gift, requiring all dates to be valid 
or the entire option will be invalid. 
In order to promote the alienability of the estate, the legisla-
ture in its codification should not extend the lives in being application 
beyond twenty-one years from the creation of the option. Allowing 
an option contract to run beyond twenty-one years would operate as a 
disincentive for the property holder to invest capital into the property 
due to the risk of forfeiture.291  The court in Buffalo Seminary applied 
the remoteness of vesting application due to these risks, and the legis-
lature should codify this holding cognizant of the same risks.292 
ii. Proposed Enactment of New York Estates, 
Powers, and Trusts Law § 9-1.9(b) – The 
Applicability to Commercial Option Contracts 
The New York legislature should codify the Court of Ap-
peals’ holding in Symphony Space which applied the RAP remote-
ness of vesting application to commercial option contracts.293 
The legislation should state: the remoteness of vesting princi-
ple that is defined under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1(b) is applicable 
to not only personal but also commercial options to purchase land.  
Following the same premise as non-commercial option contracts, the 
calculation of lives in being should begin to run from the date of the 
creation of the option and should terminate after twenty-one years.  If 
the optionor creates multiple dates in which the option can be exer-
cised, it shall be treated similarly to a class gift, requiring all dates to 
be valid or the entire option will be invalid.  Any exercisable option 
contract, commercial or personal, that has the possibility to vest more 
than twenty-one years from its creation, should be invalid. 
For the codification of both commercial and option contracts, 
the legislature should make it clear that the reduction of age contin-
gency savings provision cannot operate to validate an option contract 
that has an exercisable period beyond twenty-one years.  The savings 
provision can only be exercised consistently with the parties’ intent 
 
291 See Dukeminier, supra note 115, at 1909. 
292 Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
293 Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties, 669 N.E.2d at 800. 
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and does not give the courts the ability to re-write agreements.294  
When parties create an indefinite option contract, their intent is clear, 
that it should be exercisable indefinitely. 
iii. Proposed Enactment of New York Estates, 
Powers, and Trusts Law § 9-1.9(c) – 
Exceptions to the Rule’s Applicability 
Through this codification, the legislature should clearly indi-
cate what types of contracts are subject to RAP and what types are 
exempted.  The court should combine the holdings from Bruken, 
Baker, and Bleecker Street into one coherent rule.295 
The legislature should state: the remoteness of vesting princi-
ple that is defined under New York E.P.T.L. § 9-1.1(b) is not appli-
cable to rights of first refusal, options to renew a lease appurtenant, 
and options to terminate a lease.  The legislature should make it clear 
that the problems the rule attempted to prohibit are not present in 
these types of option agreements.296 
The right of first refusal, unlike the purchase option, should 
be exempted from RAP. The evils posed by options to purchase are 
not present in the right of first refusal context because a right of first 
refusal contract does not create a disincentive to invest capital into 
property.297  In an option contract, the optionee has the ability to force 
the current possessor of the property to sell the property at his elec-
tion.298  In contrast, under a right of first refusal, the holder of the 
preemptive right does not have the ability to force the current posses-
sor to sell the property.299  A right of first refusal can only be exer-
 
294 Id. at 807. 
295 The legislature should also codify the holding of Wildenstein, where the court held that 
a right of first refusal to purchase chattels is not subject to the remoteness of vesting applica-
tion of RAP.  Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d at 834-35.  The legislature 
should state: the remoteness of vesting principle that is defined under New York E.P.T.L. § 
9-1.1(b) is not applicable to a right of first refusal to purchase chattels or other types of per-
sonal property.  RAP is not applicable to such rights because the evils that the rule attempted 
to prohibit are not present.  Id. at 833-34.  There is no disincentive on the part of the chattel 
owner to invest in the chattel.  Id. at 833. 
296 There are two primary purposes for the RAP: 1) to strike down dead hand control; and 
2) to limit the restraints on alienation of the estate.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 
26, at 880. 
297 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
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cised if the property owner decides to sell the property.300  The cur-
rent possessor has no disincentive to improve the property because 
there is less of a risk of forfeiture and his purchase of the property 
generally will not be frustrated. 
The evils that the rule attempted to prohibit are also not pre-
sent in the leasehold context when the lessor holds the option.301  Un-
der the common law theory of ameliorative waste, a lessee is not 
supposed to make alterations to or invest capital into the leased prop-
erty.302  Consequently, the lessee only risks the loss of his leasehold 
interest in the property.303  While this may indirectly frustrate his 
lease of the property, the lessee would not lose an investment, but 
merely lose his leasehold that is not subject to RAP. 
Because leasehold options and rights of first refusal do not 
fall within the purview of the RAP, the legislature should carve out 
clear exceptions for these future interests in the manner presented 
above. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The common law application of the RAP can easily be re-
duced to one simple phrase: “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, 
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interests.”304  However, its application is not so sim-
ple.  While New York has adopted the common law rule in many re-
spects,305 the New York legislature has made several modifications to 
the common law application of the rule306 that have resulted in New 
York’s evolution to a modern application of the RAP. 
These modifications have been beneficial to the evolution of 
the RAP by saving many future interests from invalidation under the 
common law rule.  New York should serve as a model for other 
common law jurisdictions, as it has effectively eased the application 
of the RAP.  In addition, New York should codify its application re-
lating to options, as this is the only application yet to be codified, to 
 
300 Id. 
301 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 484. 
302 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. at 1012. 
303 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones, LLC, 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
304 See GRAY, supra note 3, at § 201 (citation omitted). 
305 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1966). 
306 Id. 
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promote greater alienability and decrease dead hand control. Doing 
so will further support the evolution of the New York RAP to a mod-
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